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Abstract
This paper explores employment trajectories of workers exposed to technological change.
Based on individual-level panel data from the United Kingdom, we rst conrm that the
country has undergone job polarization: the share of middle-skilled routine workers has de-
clined, while non-routine jobs in both high- and low-skilled occupations have increased. Next,
we zoom in on actual transition patterns of threatened routine workers. Despite the aggregate
decline in routine work, most aected workers manage to remain in the labor market: about
64% “survive" in routine work, 24% switch to other (better or worse paying) jobs, almost 10%
exit routine work via retirement and only a small minority end up unemployed. Based on
this nding, the nal part of our analysis studies the economic implications of remaining
in a digitalizing occupational environment. We rely on an original approach that specic-
ally captures the impact of information and communication technology at the industry level
and nd evidence for a digital Matthew eect: While outcomes are on average positive, it is
rst and foremost non-routine workers in cognitively demanding jobs that benet from the
penetration of new technologies in the workplace. In conclusion, we discuss if labor market
polarization is a likely source of intensied political conict.
†Weatherhead Center for International Aairs, Harvard University. tkurer@wca.harvard.edu.
∗Institut de Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. agallego@ibei.org.
1 Introduction
Automation, digitalization, and, increasingly, articial intelligence are profoundly transform-
ing the world of work. Changing job skill demands create substantial uncertainty about work-
ers’ fortunes in the labor markets of the future. In this article, we study the eects of techno-
logical change on individual labor market trajectories with worker-level data. From a political
science perspective, examining individual trajectories is crucial since distributional questions
seem more important than overall wealth eects. Whether digitalization is a likely source of
political disruption depends on the distributive patterns underlying aggregate changes in the
employment structure. Even if workplace automation does not result in net job loss, polit-
ical backlash is possible if disadvantages are concentrated among politically powerful groups.
At the same time, the progressive nature of technological change allows aected individuals
time to adapt. Workers in occupations susceptible to automation might manage to switch jobs,
while those unable to adapt may have the opportunity to exit the labor force non-traumatically
through (early) retirement. Such a scenario would protect them from the experience of job
displacement and hence attenuate the political repercussions of economic transformation. In
other words, understanding individual-level labor market trajectories is a fundamental pre-
requisite to assess whether digitalization is a likely source for the political disruptions we
currently observe.
We add to the literature on the social and political consequences of technological change
by studying (a) which share of workers susceptible to digitalization are actually forced out
of their jobs and (b) where they end up. Furthermore, we ask (c) how digitalization aects
objective (income) and subjective (job satisfaction) labor market outcomes and (d) whether
adverse economic eects are particularly pronounced among so called routine workers. An
inuential study in labor economics (Autor et al. 2003) has suggested that routineness is the
primary characteristic that renders jobs susceptible to automation. Routine occupations are
mostly middle-skill and middle-wage jobs in both blue- (e.g., manufacturing) and white-collar
(e.g., administration) sectors.
Our approach goes beyond compositional changes in the employment structure and stud-
ies the actual frequency of distinct trajectories out of threatened routine jobs among the active
2
labor force. We report three empirical results: First, the labor market in the United Kingdom
has undergone clear-cut employment polarization, characterized by a decline in the share of
routine jobs relative to non-routine jobs. Second, this aggregate decline does not result in
massively increased unemployment rates among (former) routine workers at the individual
level. A majority manage to cling to their jobs until retirement, about a quarter switch into
better or worse paying jobs in less threatened non-routine occupations, and only a small group
actually end up unemployed. In all likelihood, the aggregate decline in routine jobs is driven by
fewer new entrants to routine jobs rather than abrupt exit. The relatively large share of “sur-
vivors" motivates the third part of our analysis, which focuses on the economic implications of
staying in a digitalizing industry. We rely on an original approach building on industry-level
data specically capturing the investment in information and communication technology. We
show that increases in the penetration of ICT at work are on average economically benecial
for workers, presumably because technology creates productivity gains. Our main indicator of
“economic benets" is labor income, perhaps the most typical indicator of objective economic
well-being, but we also look at subjective measures, i.e., individual job satisfaction.
However, there is an important qualication to the positive economic impact in the overall
sample: Eects are not constant across the entire population. Middle-skilled routine workers,
who are particularly susceptible to automation, benet less than non-routine cognitive work-
ers. Wage growth is lower and subjective job satisfaction does not increase at all with rising
computerization and digitalization. “Survival" in routine jobs thus comes at the cost of eco-
nomic stagnation. Low-skilled non-routine manual workers fare similarly badly. The results
thus highlight strong distributive implications of technological change and provide evidence
for a digital Matthew eect that pitches highly skilled and specialized workers in cognitively
demanding jobs against the rest. Although technology tends to improve labor market out-
comes on average for all, the main beneciaries are workers in non-routine cognitive jobs.
The substantive implications of our results are open to interpretation. On the one hand,
we nd that digitalization in an industry increases wages across occupations. Workers who
stay in non-routine manual jobs and routine jobs become better o in absolute terms (even if
not in relative terms) as their industry digitalizes. On the other hand, digitalization has hetero-
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geneous consequences for dierent types of tasks and hence exacerbates existing inequalities
in pay and job satisfaction. Given these unequal gains and losses, the positive net eects of
technological innovation may not prevent political push-back. Recent research suggests that
individuals react very sensitively to relative changes in economic well-being even if absolute
indicators would not necessarily give rise to concern (see Kurer 2017; Burgoon et al. 2018; Im
et al. 2018).
Our contribution to this special issue using worker-level evidence attempts to bridge the
link between studies of aggregate economic trends and the nascent literature on the political
consequences of technological change. Taken together, our results suggest more nuance than
a broad brush story based on previous ndings would suggest. Given that we do not nd evid-
ence of negative eects (in absolute terms) on individual economic well-being, the question
becomes whether the growth in inequality due to technological change is suciently signic-
ant to motivate political discontent or whether other groups left out of our analysis (such as
future labor market entrants or the long-term unemployed) are signicant enough to create a
political backlash.
2 Data and Operationalization
2.1 Individual-Level Data on Occupational Transitions and Labor Market Outcomes
We rely on longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and the Under-
standing Society (UKHLS) survey in order to assess individual occupational trajectories, as
well as the individual labor market outcomes (wages and job satisfaction) of workers exposed
to varying levels of digitalization.
The BHPS is a longitudinal study that has interviewed approximately 10,000 individuals
nested in 5,000 households drawn from a stratied random sample of the British population
yearly from 1991 to 2008. In 2009 the BHPS was transformed into the Understanding Society
(UKHLS) survey, leading to a substantial increase in sample size (for details on survey design
see Buck and McFall 2011).
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2.2 Industry-Level Data on Digitalization
We study the impact of new technologies on objective and subjective labor market outcomes
based on a novel approach which combines individual-level panel data with data about the
prevalence of information and communication technology (ICT) at the industry level. The
main advantage of this approach is that it facilitates the creation of a longitudinal data set,
which includes both time-varying indicators of the increasing importance of technology at
the workplace as well as time-varying information on individual labor market outcomes.
We use EU KLEMS data (Jäger 2016) to create our measure of digitalization (see also Graetz
and Michaels 2015; Michaels et al. 2014). The EU KLEMS database contains yearly measures
of output, input, and productivity for 40 industries in a wide range of countries, including
the UK. We use the September 2017 release, which covers the period 1997 through 2017. The
data are compiled using information from national statistical oces and then harmonized to
ensure comparability. Most importantly for our purposes, the EU KLEMS database provides a
breakdown of capital into ICT and non-ICT assets (O’Mahony and Timmer 2009).
2.3 Sample
For the more descriptive rst part of our analysis, we exploit the full potential of the combined
BHPS/UKHLS data and include all respondents between 1991 and 2015 with non-missing in-
formation on occupation (ISCO codes). This sample contains 320,080 observations from 66,267
dierent individuals. On average, respondents are observed in 4.8 waves. For the second part
of the analysis, we excluded respondents surveyed between 1991 and 1996 as the 2017 EU
KLEMS release only includes data from 1997 onward. We also lose people who drop out of
the labor force because they are no longer associated with an industry. This second sample
contains 268,120 observations from 59,793 dierent individuals (on average 4.5 waves per in-
dividual) with non-missing data on occupation and industry codes.
3 Employment Structure and Occupational Transitions
To begin, Figure 1 shows relative shares of routine work and non-routine work over time. In
line with previous examinations of aggregate trends in the employment structure in the United
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Kingdom (Goos and Manning 2007; Goos et al. 2014), we see a clear trend of job polarization.
The share of middle-skilled routine jobs steadily declines whereas the share of both kinds of
non-routine work, high- and low-skilled, grows over time.The coding of task groups is based
































Figure 1: Aggregate Trends in the Employment Structure
Figure 2 provides additional descriptive information with respect to the three occupational
groups under examination. The left panel displays average monthly income and conrms the
impression of routine workers being in the middle of the earnings distribution. The rank order
of the three task groups regarding income does not change substantially over time although
the wage premium of high-skilled work in cognitively demanding jobs continues to increase
over time, which can be read from the growing distance to the two other task groups. The age
structure displayed in the right panel reveals an interesting pattern: The average age among
routine workers distinctly increases over time relative to both non-routine groups. This is
consistent with lower rates of entry by young labor market entrants into routine jobs (Cortes
2016) and conrms the relationship between changes in the size of an occupation and shifts in
the age distribution of its workforce, which has been documented for the United States (Autor
and Dorn 2009). An implication of this pattern is that the relative share of routine workers
remains fairly stable among older respondents while less and less younger respondents enter
routine jobs. Put dierently, the “decline of the middle" is driven by declining entry rates of






















(b) Age (in years)
Figure 2: Average Income and Age Structure of Occupational Groups
Aggregate trends provide a valuable starting point but researchers studying the political
consequences of technological change should have a keen interest in the specic occupa-
tional transitions underlying the decline in routine employment. Polarization can be driven
by various forces, most importantly increased unemployment rates, increased rates of oc-
cupational switching, or higher exit rates, e.g., into retirement or disability (Cortes 2016).
Such distinct trajectories out of routine work most likely trigger dierent political reactions.
Technology-induced job displacement presumably creates political push-back only if workers
cannot nd better alternative employment (Caprettini and Voth 2017) and are not compensated
or sheltered by a system of social protection (see also Gingrich 2018). We would not expect
workers who are able to upgrade to better jobs or who exit the labor force through retirement
to accumulate strong grievances that resonate in disruptive political behavior.
Figure 3 makes full use of the longitudinal data and visualizes actual transition patterns
between the three occupational groups as well as alternative exit options, i.e., unemployment
and retirement. The alluvial plot on the left shows transitions between the rst occupation
that has been recorded for each respondent and the same respondent’s job situation in the
last completed BHPS/UKHLS wave. The plot on the right shows transition probabilities for
sub-samples with varying duration between the rst and last observation since the likelihood
of transitions obviously increases with the observed time span. By design, the alluvial chart
on the left is a weighted average of the varying transition probabilities over time plotted on
the right. The key point here is that occupational transitions happen less often than the ag-
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gregate numbers in Figure 1 might suggest. Based on an average time span of 4.8 years, a clear
majority (64%) of routine workers “survive" in their routine jobs. About every fourth routine
worker switches into non-routine jobs that are less exposed to digitalization, where upgrad-
ing into high-skilled cognitive work is slightly more frequent (13%) than downgrading into
low-skilled manual jobs (11%). Only 3.4% ended up unemployed. The plot on the right adds
interesting nuance to this snapshot. Surviving in routine work clearly becomes less frequent
with increasing time span, i.e., with increasing duration between the rst and last observa-
tion in BHPS/UKHLS, but the lion’s share of this decline is due to “natural" transitions into
retirement. All other transition probabilities remain stable after about seven years of observa-
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(b) Occupational Transitions by Time Span between
Observations
Figure 3: Occupational Transition Patterns
This pattern of individual-level transitions thus suggests that the main mechanism behind
job polarization is not layo, displacement, or general upgrading but a gradual transformation
of the employment structure over generations. Rather than being immediately and massively
replaced, an interpretation sometimes conveyed in the media, routine work slowly goes ex-
tinct.1
1There are also some transitions into routine work but these are less frequent than into any of the non-routine
task groups (see Table 2 for the full transition matrix).
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4 Digitalization and Labor Market Outcomes
In line with the above analysis of individual occupational transitions, overall employment
numbers have not decreased in recent years despite the demonstrably successful impact of
new technologies on productivity (Oliner and Sichel 2000). While automation substitutes for
some tasks, it complements others and can thereby increase output, earnings, and demand for
labor (Autor 2015; Autor and Salomons 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2016). A comprehensive
assessment of the political consequences of technological change should thus not exclusively
focus on the most obvious losers, i.e., displaced workers, but rather on those who remain in
the labor market. In electoral terms, they represent a more relevant part of the population.
Importantly, a neutral or even positive impact on overall employment should not hide
the fact that shrinking job opportunities in the middle present a challenge for many, e.g.,
workers with diculties adapting to a changing demand for skills or mid-skilled labor market
entrants who traditionally entered routine jobs. Digitalization has very specic eects on skill
demand (Autor et al. 2003) and accordingly might produce politically relevant grievances even
among workers who manage to cling to their jobs. The last part of our analysis thus studies
heterogeneous labor market outcomes among the active labor force. We ask how digitalization
aects wages and job satisfaction and whether these eects vary between dierent task groups.
In line with the literature on skill demand, we would expect non-routine workers, in particular
high-skilled ones, to reap a disproportionate share of the economic benets from digitalization.
4.1 Estimation
The breakdown of EU KLEMS data into ICT and non-ICT assets allows for the construction of




Where ICT capital is real xed capital stock in computing equipment, communications
equipment, computer software, and databases in industry j and year t, in million GBP at con-
stant 2010 prices, estimated using the perpetual inventory method based on past investment
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and applying a geometric depreciation rate. We divide ICT capital stock by hours worked (also
in millions) to adjust for the size of the industry. As expected, the resulting indicator of ICT
capital stock in GBP per hour worked (mean=2.1, sd=2.4) increases over time. Descriptive in-
formation by year as well as a breakdown of ICT capital stock per industry is provided in the
appendix (Table 1 and Figure 5).
We use xed-eects regressions to estimate the eects of digitalization at the industry level
on income and subjective job satisfaction. The general model is:
Yijt = βDjt + θSijt + δSijt ×Djt + γCijt + ηij + µt + εijt,
where Yijt is the outcome of interest for individual i in industry j at time t. We look at monthly
wages and subjective job satisfaction to measure economic benets from digitalization. Yijt is
a function of the time-varying indicator of digitalization at the industry level (Djt). To test for
heterogeneous eects between routine and non-routine workers, we introduce an interaction
term between digitalizationDjt and individual’s occupational task group (non-routine cognit-
ive, routine, non-routine manual) Sijt. Cijt is a vector of individual-level controls. Due to the
potential post-treatment bias that we may introduce by controlling for time-varying covari-
ates (which may themselves be aected by changes in a workers’ industry) we only include
age and age squared as controls.
The term ηij is a vector of individual by industry xed eects which captures all time-
invariant variables that might aect self-selection of workers into specic workplaces such
as their gender, personality, or family origin as well as time-invariant industry-level charac-
teristics. The individual by industry xed eects includes separate intercepts for the same
individual in periods when he or she has worked in a dierent industry. Finally, we include
year-xed eects µt to account for common shocks. This specication is quite demanding and
only exploits over time variation in the level of digitalization within industries for workers
who remain in the same industry (but not necessarily occupation) for two or more periods.
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4.2 Results
Our analysis provides clear evidence of unequally distributed benets. The left panel in Figure
4 displays the results with respect to labor market income.2 While the earnings of every task
group grow with increasing digitalization, thus conrming the textbook expectation of posit-
ive overall eects, the main winners clearly are workers in cognitively demanding non-routine
jobs. Here, the wage increases due to digitalization are nearly double the size of both routine
and low-skilled non-routine jobs. This nding nicely ties in with previous work studying dis-
tributive implications of the service-sector transition and rise of the knowledge economy (e.g.,
Wren 2013). The size of the eect is substantial: An increase in ICT capital stock of one GBP
per hour worked (=0.41 standard deviations) is related to a wage increase of almost GBP 60 per
month for a high-skilled non-routine worker, which is about 2.5 percent of the 2017 median
gross wage in the United Kingdom.3 Note that the dierence between non-routine cognitive
workers and the two other task groups is statistically signicant (see full regression tables in
the appendix).4
The right panel conrms that the unequal distribution of benets is reected in subjective
perceptions. Only high-skilled non-routine workers, who benet most from complementary
eects of new technology, are more satised with their jobs in the face of increasing digitaliz-
ation of their industry. By contrast, objectively positive — even if weaker — eects on wages
do not translate into higher satisfaction at the workplaces of routine and non-routine manual
workers. However, it should be noted that the impact on subjective economic well-being is
weaker than the eects on earnings. The magnitude is substantively small and the dierences
between groups are much less pronounced (see Table 3 in the appendix for details).
2Our model specication with a focus on those who remain in the labor force is not particularly suited to study
the eects of digitalization on unemployment. That said, some tentative analyses point to very weak employ-
ment eects. Digitalization does not seem to result in higher unemployment rates, which is in line with our
more descriptive analysis of individual transition patterns. A more likely consequence than unemployment
is occupational switching into other jobs within the active labor force.
3According to the Oce for National Statistics, the median gross weekly earnings for full-time employees were
GBP 550 in April 2017. Link
4While non-overlapping individual condence intervals mean that the dierence is statistically signicant, the
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Figure 4: Marginal Eects of Digitalization on Labor Market Outcomes, conditional on Task Group
5 Discussion
This special issue explores the political consequences of technological change and employ-
ment polarization. Our contribution focuses on the distributive implications of changes in the
labor market. Distributive conicts are very common roots of political contestation and we
demonstrate that the benets of digitalization, indeed, are not equally shared.
Who are the winners, who are the losers? Our analysis reveals relatively complex distribu-
tional implications, which are not always spelled out explicitly in existing work. The tension
arises from the fact that the task-based literature in labor economics emphasizes routine work-
ers’ disadvantages even vis-à-vis lower skilled non-routine manual workers (Autor et al. 2003).
This is not entirely in line with the main thrust of our paper, which is that non-routine cog-
nitive workers benet compared to everybody else, i.e., compared to both routine as well as
non-routine manual workers. We can reconcile these somewhat contradictory expectations
by more explicit reference to the particular outcome of interest. When looking at wages and
job satisfaction, the main nding is polarization between high-skilled workers and the rest.
By contrast, when looking at employment shares, both non-routine groups are doing better
than routine workers. However, our analysis shows that this decline in the aggregate does not
necessarily have negative material implications. Many routine workers remain in their jobs
until retirement. The decreasing share of routine jobs is primarily driven by lower entry rates,
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not by massive involuntary exit. We would expect this pattern to generalize beyond our single
case because, if anything, the exible labor market of the UK allows for more rather than less
job switching and more rather than less frequent unemployment spells.
An important take-away from the relatively large share of survivors in routine work is that
a comprehensive analysis of the political consequences of technological change should not
exclusively focus on those forced out of the labor market as a result of increasing automation.
A politically signicant part of the electorate is confronted with increasing prevalence of new
technologies in their current work environment. A relevant question to ask is thus how the
experience of digitalizing work environment aects the labor market outcomes of those who
keep their jobs. If a majority keep their job and everyone who stays benets to a similar
extent from the introduction of digital technology at the workplace, we would not expect
strong adverse repercussions in the political arena.
Interestingly, we nd that all occupational groups experience income gains as a consequence
of digitalization. Yet, the actual magnitude of these material benets varies strongly between
groups. The main beneciaries are high-skilled workers in cognitively demanding jobs, who
are well-equipped to make use of the complementaries oered by new technology. The large
residual group of middle-skilled routine and low-skilled non-routine workers (about 60% of the
labor force in our sample) also experience some wage increases, but these are not substantial
enough to be reected in more positive subjective evaluations of job satisfaction. The promise
of new technology hence primarily serves those who are already in a privileged labor market
position.
Our results are open to interpretation. Automation and digitalization provide opportun-
ities for many and in general improve individual labor market outcomes. As a consequence,
technological change might not look like a plausible source behind recent political disruptions.
However, not all voters have an equal share in this economic boost. Employment polarization
clearly results in income polarization with disproportionate wage growth for highly skilled
and specialized winners of digitalization. This digital Matthew eect could create grievances
notwithstanding positive overall eects of technology in economic terms. The combination
of generally increasing well-being and the parallel economic stagnation of politically power-
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ful groups might present a toxic political cocktail. Recent research has shown that a positive
economic environment can even reinforce political dissatisfaction among those who do not
get their piece of the growing cake: when everybody else is thriving, individual stagnation
produces even stronger political reactions (see ?Aytaç et al. 2018). Another contribution to
this special issue (Im et al. 2018) provides further evidence in this direction. Indeed, relat-
ive deprivation theory (Runciman 1966) has long established that economic stagnation and
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Appendix
year mean sd min max
1 1997 1.022 1.162 0.051 10.163
2 1998 1.118 1.238 0.057 8.952
3 1999 1.296 1.424 0.071 10.834
4 2000 1.348 1.612 0.065 12.254
5 2001 1.432 1.687 0.098 11.958
6 2002 1.557 1.789 0.091 12.238
7 2003 1.747 1.994 0.104 12.510
8 2004 1.815 2.014 0.106 14.019
9 2005 1.920 2.127 0.133 15.328
10 2006 2.045 2.319 0.151 18.517
11 2007 2.151 2.442 0.167 20.393
12 2008 2.353 2.782 0.197 24.698
13 2009 2.251 2.506 0.218 22.799
14 2010 2.293 2.513 0.220 23.252
15 2011 2.309 2.519 0.237 22.880
16 2012 2.361 2.570 0.240 22.427
17 2013 2.397 2.616 0.264 22.624
18 2014 2.476 2.683 0.260 23.502
19 2015 2.482 2.815 0.259 25.300
Table 1: ICT capital stock over time
NRC R NRM Unemp Retired
NRC 0.802 0.048 0.051 0.017 0.083
R 0.127 0.643 0.110 0.034 0.085
NRM 0.100 0.067 0.733 0.037 0.062
Table 2: Transition Matrix
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Wholesale trade Wood, paper, printing
Rubber and plastics Telecommunications Textiles, leather Transport equipment Transport, storage
PROFESSIONAL, ADMIN. Public adm. and defence Publishing, audiovisual REAL ESTATE Retail trade
MINING AND QUARRYING Motor vehicles Other manufacturing Other services Post and courier
Food, beverages, tobacco Health and social work Information technology Machinery n.e.c. Metals
CONSTRUCTION Education ELECTR., GAS, WATER Electrical and optical FINANCE AND INSURANCE
ACCOMMODATION, FOOD AGRICULTURE, FISHING Arts, recreation Chemicals Coke, refined petroleum
2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015
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Figure 6: Relative Employment Share over Time and Age Group
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(1) (2)
Monthly Income Job Satisfaction
ICT Capital 52.961*** 0.026**
(7.30) (0.01)
Non-Routine Cognitive ref. ref.
Routine -21.565* -0.042
(10.99) (0.03)
Non-Routine Manual -61.496*** -0.052*
(10.81) (0.02)
Routine X ICT Capital -26.049*** -0.007
(3.63) (0.01)








Year FE yes yes
Ind X Industry FE yes yes
N 219657 238397
* = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001
Table 3: Eects of Digitalization on Labor Market Outcomes
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